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ABSTRACT: Fewer than a third of rape victims report their rape to the police.
This low reporting rate appears to exist not only in jurisdictions with police
departments that intentionally discourage victims, but also, paradoxically, in
areas with departments that believe they encourage victims to report and pursue
allegations of rape. Relying on original qualitative research conducted with two
local police departments (a city department and a university department) as a
case study, this Note identifies a likely cause of the widespread underreporting-
"rape process templates"-and offers the foundation for a solution. Rape process
templates are unwritten narratives about how rape allegations progress that are
so commonly applied to rape investigations and prosecutions that they become
preset outlines of how those investigations and prosecutions proceed. According
to the templates, rape prosecutions are "he said, she said" cases that lack
physical, corroborating evidence and involve a "brutal cross-examination" of the
victim at trial. In reality, however, only a small fraction of rape investigations
and prosecutions necessarily have these characteristics. But despite that reality,
imposing these templates onto rape investigations causes the allegations to
become "he said, she said" cases that will involve a "brutal cross-examination."
By prompting this self-fulfilling cycle, the templates preserve the widespread
traditional hostility to rape allegations and the hesitancy to consider provable
anything but a small class of those allegations. Based on these insights about rape
process templates and the case study's demonstration of the effectiveness of
federal oversight of university police departments in making the departments
more responsive to the realities of rape, this Note recommends a system of state
oversight over municipal police departments that is designed to reduce the
deployment and effect of the templates. The state oversight must require
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mandatory training on the unfounded assumptions behind the templates, regular
meetings with local victim advocates, and the tracking and evaluation of granular
metrics on the progress of rape allegations through police investigations.
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INTRODUCTION
Exceptionally few rape victims-fewer than a third'-report their rape to
the police; an even smaller number pursue their allegation to an arrest.2 Though
some victims affirmatively choose not to report, many do not report or pursue
their allegations because they face powerful external barriers that make reporting
seem fruitless. One powerful barrier is the treatment of rape victims by police
officers, even well-intentioned and facially unbiased ones.
As this Note reveals, police detectives, often unintentionally, impose
preconceived assumptions about how rape investigations inevitably will proceed
onto their investigations. This imposition creates a self-reinforcing cycle in
which the detectives ensure, again unintentionally, that all rape investigations do
indeed fit into those preconceived templates, despite the mismatch between the
templates and reality. In response, rape victims avoid or halt the investigatory
process as they discover the existence of these preconceived notions of how their
rape investigation will proceed and as they see how poorly these notions fit the
realities of their own rape.
A significant number of rape victims choose not to officially report or pursue
their allegations of rape. According to the Centers for Disease Control and
1. Jennifer L. Truman & Lynn Langton, Criminal Victimization, 2014, BUREAU JUST. STAT. 7 (Sept.
29, 2015), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/cvl4.pdf.
2. This paper uses the terms "rape" rather than "sexual assault" and "rape victims" instead of
"survivors" because the detectives interviewed tended to use these terms. This choice does not reflect a
view on what terms are most appropriate outside of this context.
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Prevention (CDC) and the Department of Justice (DOJ), about 20% of women
in America (23 million women) are raped during their lives.' Around two million
women are raped each year.5 Yet fewer than a third of these victims-somewhere
between 5% and 33%-report their rape to the police.6 More than twice that,
65% of rape victims, disclose their rape to a close friend or family.' This
reporting rate to police for rape is much lower than the reporting rate for other
violent crime, such as assault (50%) and robbery (60%).8
Though the rate of false reports is low, few of the rape allegations reported
lead to arrests or convictions. Fewer than 5% of rape allegations are unfounded.9
Yet only approximately 30% of reported rapes result in an arrest or prosecution;'0
3. The Bureau of Justice Statistics (BJS) provides other statistics that are not used in this Note. The
BJS National Crime Victimization Survey (NCVS) reports fewer rapes (284,000 in 2014), but
acknowledges that these lower statistics likely are inaccurate. Truman & Langton, supra note 1, at 2 tbl. 1.
In fact, recognizing the "concern about potential underestimation of rape and sexual assault on the NCVS,"
the BJS itself commissioned the National Research Council (NRC) to evaluate the accuracy of its own
NCVS in terms of "measuring incidents of rape and sexual assault from the criminal justice perspective."
Comm. on Nat'l Statistics Div. of Behavioral & Soc. Sci. & Educ., Estimating the Incidence ofRape and
Sexual Assault: Panel on Measuring Rape and Sexual Assault in Bureau ofJustice Statistics Household
Surveys, NAT'L RES. COUNCIL 2 (Candace Kruttschnitt et al. eds., 2014),
http://www.nap.edu/read/18605/chapter/1. The NRC concluded that the NCVS "does not measure...
rape and sexual assault with the precision needed" and that it likely underreports rape. Id. at 5; see also
Corey Rayburn Yung, Rape Law Fundamentals, 27 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 1, 38-41 (2015) (explaining
why FBI crime statistics so dramatically undercount rape).
4. Matthew J. Breiding, Prevalence and Characteristics of Sexual Violence, Stalking, and Intimate
Partner Violence Victimization-National Intimate Partner and Sexual Violence Survey, United States,
2011, 63 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. RPT. SURVEILLANCE SUMMARIES 1, 4 (Sept. 5, 2014),
http://stacks.cdc.gov/view/cdc/37108; Patricia Tjaden & Nancy Thoennes, Full Report of the Prevalence,
Incidence, and Consequences of Violence: Findings From the National Violence Against Women Survey,
NAT'L INST. JUST. 13 (Nov. 2000), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffilesl/nij/183781.pdf The report authored
by Breiding defines "rape" as "completed or attempted forced penetration or alcohol- or drug-facilitated
penetration." Breiding, supra, at 3.
5. Breiding, supra note 4, at 4; see also Bonnie S. Fisher et al., The Sexual Victimization of College
Women, U.S. DEP'T JUST. 10 (Dec. 2000), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffilesl/nij/182369.pdf (relying on
data from the 1997 National College Women Sexual Victimization survey to estimate that 5% of college
women are raped each year); Dean G. Kilpatrick et al., Drug-Facilitated, Incapacitated, and Forcible
Rape: A National Study, MED. U. S.C. (2007), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffilesl/nij/grants/219181.pdf
(reporting that 18% of women are raped in their lives).
6. Truman & Langton, supra note 1, at 7.
7. Lisa A. Paul et al., College Women's Experiences With Rape Disclosure: A National Study, 19
VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 486 (2013) (compiling statistics on the incidence and reporting of rape from
dozens of published studies and surveys).
8. Truman & Langton, supra note 1, at 7.
9. David Lisak et al., False Allegations of Sexual Assault, 16 VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 1318
(2010) (reporting that only 5.9% of cases at a "major Northeastern university" were false reports); Cassia
Spohn et al., Unfounding Sexual Assault: Examining the Decision To Unfound and Identifying False
Reports, 48 L. & SoC'Y REv. 161, 174 (2014) (reporting that in the Los Angeles Police Department, "4.5
percent of all cases ... were false reports").
10. Sourcebook of Criminal Justice Statistics Online, ST. U. N.Y. ALBANY tbl.4.2.201 1,
http://www.albany.edulsourcebook/pdf/t42201 I.pdf (containing data on arrest rates per 100,000
inhabitants from the DOJ's Bureau of Justice Statistics); id. tbl.3.106.2012,
http://www.albany.edu/sourcebook/pdf/t3l062012.pdf (containing data on the "Estimated number and
rate (per 100,000 inhabitants) of offenses known to police" from the Bureau of Justice Statistics). The
DOJ statistics show that in 2011, there were 27.0 forcible rapes per 100,000 people reported to the police
and only 6.3 arrests per 100,000 for forcible rape. The numbers are consistent for 2010 and 2009 as well.
Id.; see also Kathleen Daly & Brigitte Bouhours, Rape and Attrition in the Legal Process, 39 CRIME &
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and of those that do result in an arrest, only around 50% are prosecuted and result
in a felony conviction.1 In total, between 0.5% and 5% of all rapes committed
result in any conviction (felony or misdemeanor)."
The statistics on the incidence, reporting rates, and arrest and conviction
rates for rape alone do not prove that victims choose not to pursue or to drop rape
allegations because of police action. Police and prosecutors drop some cases with
a cooperative victim and sometimes rape victims drop cases for reasons not
directly related to their confidence in the investigation and prosecution. Rape
victims may distrust the criminal justice system in general,13  fear its
consequences for themselves1 4 or for their rapist,15 expect not to be satisfied with
JUST. 565, 568 (2010) (reporting that only 30% of sexual offenses reported to the police proceed to
prosecution).
11. Sourcebook of Criminal Justice Statistics Online, supra note 10, tbl.5.0002.2004,
http://www.albany.edu/sourcebook/pdf/t500022004.pdf ("Felony convictions and sentences and rate per
100 arrests"); id. tbl.5.58.2004, http://www.albany.edu/sourcebook/pdf/t5582004.pdf ("Conviction
offense of felony defendants in the 75 largest counties"); Daly & Bouhours, supra note 10 (reporting that
12.5% of sexual offenses reported to the police result in any conviction).
12. Kimberly A. Lonsway & Joanne Archambault, The "Justice Gap "for Sexual Assault Cases, 18
VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 145, 157 (2012) (aggregating statistics from the DOJ's Bureau of Justice
Statistics).
13. BETH RICHIE, ARRESTED JUSTICE 6 (2012) ("[Mlost vulnerable young women of color ... d[o]
not turn to formal systems as a remedy for their victimization because of the strong distrust of the criminal
legal system in their disadvantaged communities."); see also Donna Coker et al., Responses from the
Field: Sexual Assault, Domestic Violence, and Policing: Highlights from the Full Report, AM. CIV.
LIBERTIES UNION 3-4 (Oct. 2015), https://www.aclu.org/report/highlights-responses-field (providing a
survey of nine hundred "[a]dvocates, service providers, attorneys, and people working in membership-
based organizations" related to domestic violence and sexual assault) (reporting that over 80% of
respondents believed that marginalized communities' relationship with the police influenced victims'
willingness to contact the police).
14. Victims have a number of fears about the consequences of the criminal justice process. One is
that sending their rapist to jail will lead to more violence once he returns. See Donna Coker & Ahjan6 D.
Macquoid, Why Opposing Hyper-Incarceration Should Be Central to the Work of the Anti-Domestic
Violence Movement, 5 U. MIAMI RACE & SOC. JUST. L. REV. 585 (2015); Angela P. Harris,
Heteropatriarchy Kills, 37 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 13, 26-32 (2011). A second fear is that a report will
reveal the victim's own lawbreaking. See Michael Kagan, Immigrant Victims, Immigrant Accusers, 48 U.
MICH. J.L. REFORM 915, 921 (2015) (describing undocumented immigrant victims' concerns about
deportation); Barbara S. Jones et al., Report of the Response Systems to Adult Sexual Assault Crimes
Panel, U.S. DEP'T JUST. 8 (June 2014),
http://responsesystemspanel.whs.mil/public/docs/Reports/00_Final/RSPReportFinal_20140627.pdf
(explaining that victims fear "prosecution and punishment for their own minor collateral misconduct" in
the context of the military); Christopher P. Krebs et al., The Campus Sexual Assault (CSA) Study: Final
Report, NAT'L INST. JUST. 2-9 (Oct. 2007), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffilesl/nij/grants/221153.pdf
(College "victims . .. may be concerned about reprisal for violating [drug and alcohol] policies.").
15. Some victims worry about the consequences of a criminal conviction for their rapist, such being
added to a sex offender registry for the rest of his life. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:7-1 to 7-19 (West
2017) (requiring sex offenders to register in a state registry for the rest of their lives); Corey Rayburn
Yung, Banishment by a Thousand Laws: Residency Restrictions on Sex Offenders, 85 WASH. U. L. REV.
101 (2007); Corey Rayburn Yung, The Emerging Criminal War on Sex Offenders, 45 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L.
REv. 435 (2010).
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a conviction,'6 or not identify what happened to them as rape.'7 Fortunately, there
are alternatives to the criminal justice system that may provide a better response
for these victims."
But many victims may be willing to engage with the police and want
convictions, and yet do not report or pursue their allegations. A vast majority do
not report because they feel that police officers will not believe them or will
blame them for their rape.'9 What actions and messages convey this disbelief and
blame?20 What can be done to prevent the communication of such messages?
These are the questions that this Note seeks to answer.
These questions have remained unanswered in part because the popular
focus is on overtly biased detectives, their egregious actions, and their
departments' toleration of their behavior. The Missoula Police Department and
the University of Montana Office of Public Safety, as described in the popular
nonfiction book Missoula21 and in agreements with the DOJ,22 are examples. In
16. Judith Lewis Herman, Justice from the Victim's Perspective, 11 VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN
571, 575 (2005) ("[F]or many victims, even a successful legal outcome does not promise much satisfaction
because their goals are not congruent with the sanctions that the system imposes."); Heather Strang &
Lawrence W. Sherman, Repairing the Harm, 2003 UTAH L. REV. 15, 18.
17. Fisher et al., supra note 5, at 22 (reporting that more than half the victims of behavior that would
be legally classified as rape do not "consider this incident to be a rape"); see ROBIN WARSHAW, I NEVER
CALLED IT RAPE 50, 56 (1988).
18. For other remedies, see, for example, Sally F. Goldfarb, Reconceiving Civil Protection Orders
for Domestic Violence?, 29 CARDOZO L. REV. 1487 (2008) (focusing on civil law responses); Leigh
Goodmark, Law Is the Answer? Do We Know that for Sure?, 23 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 7 (2004)
(exploring community-based responses to violence); and James Ptacek & Loretta Frederick, Restorative
Justice and Intimate Partner Violence, NAT'L ONLINE RESOURCE CTR. ON VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN,
http://vawnet.org/sites/default/files/materials/files/2016-09/ARRestorativeJusticelPV.pdf (focusing on
"restorative justice").
19. See Coker et al., supra note 13, at 3-4 (finding that 88% of respondents "reported that police
'sometimes' or 'often' do not believe victims or blamed victims for the violence" and that a similar number
reported that police do not take allegations of sexual assault seriously); see also Identifying and Preventing
Gender Bias in Law Enforcement Response to Sexual Assault and Domestic Violence, DEP'T JUST. (Dec.
2015) [hereinafter DOJ Gender Bias Guidance], https://www.justice.gov/opa/file/799366/download.
20. Aurelio Jos6 Figueredo, Blame, Retribution and Deterrence Among Both Survivors and
Perpetrators of Male Violence Against Women, 8 VA. J. SOC. POL'Y & L. 219, 247 (2000) ("Although
rape victims who participate in the criminal justice process report callous or indifferent attitudes toward
victims at every stage of the proceedings, complete qualitative and quantitative documentation of victims'
experiences is lacking.").
21. Missoula narrates a series of rapes and inadequate law enforcement responses in the college
football town of Missoula, Montana. JON KRAKAUER, MISSOULA (2015). It was third on the New York
Times nonfiction bestseller list and remained on the list for a number of weeks. Combined Print & E-Book
Nonfiction, N.Y. TIMES (May 10, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/best-sellers-books/2015-05-
I 0/combined-print-and-e-book-nonfiction/list.html.
22. The DOJ found that the Missoula Police Department "discriminates against women in its
response to sexual assault ... [in ways that] compromise the effectiveness of sexual assault investigations
from the outset, make it more difficult to undercover the truth, and have the effect of depriving female
sexual assault victims of basic legal protections." Letter from Thomas E. Perez, Assistant Attorney Gen.,
Civil Rights Div., and Michael W. Cotter, United States Attorney for the District of Mont., to John Engen,
Mayor of Missoula at I (May 15, 2013),
https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/crt/legacy/2013/05/22/missoulapdfind_5-15-13.pdf. The DOJ
found that the University of Montana Office of Public Safety (OPS) also "discriminates against women"
because of its "deficiencies in policy, training, and practice," which "make it more difficult for law
enforcement o effectively investigate allegations of sexual assault, have had the effect of depriving female
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these and similar departments, detectives explicitly humiliate and blame rape
victims before closing their cases without any investigation. Detectives imply
that victims are responsible for their rape or that rape is just consensual sex that
victims later regret.23 Victims learn, through their own experience and from
friends, not to report to these departments. When focusing on these egregious
detectives and their departments, it appears obvious that biased and
unprofessional police deter victims and that reporting rates would rise if they
were prevented from acting so unprofessionally. 24 While such a straightforward
conclusion is appealing, the low reporting and arrest rates consistent across
police departments throughout the country suggest that bad actors cannot be
solely responsible for the underreporting epidemic. Though the attention on these
bad actors is merited, the accompanying lack of attention on all other
departments is not.25
The more insidious and widespread problem identified in this Note is that
even police departments that do not deserve or get the negative attention given
to Missoula-like departments still deter victims from reporting and pursuing
allegations of rape. This Note's original research conducted with two police
departments suggested that these seemingly unbiased departments still deter
sexual assault victims of basic legal protections, and reduce the ability of OPS to protect the public safety
of the entire campus." Letter from Thomas E. Perez, Assistant Attorney Gen., Civil Rights Div., and
Michael W. Cotter, United States Attorney for the District of Mont., to Royce C. Engstrom, President,
Univ. of Mont. at 1 (May 9, 2013),
https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/crt/legacy/2013/05/09/missoulafind_5-9-13.pdf, see also Press
Release, Department of Justice, Department of Justice Reaches Landmark Agreement to Improve
Missoula County Attorney's Office's Response to Reports of Sexual Assault (June 10, 2014),
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/department-justice-reaches-landmark-agreement-improve-missoula-
county-attomey-s-office-s; Special Litigation Section Case Summaries, U.S. DEP'T JUST.,
https://www.justice.gov/crt/special-litigation-section-case-summaries#mpd-summ. For a similar situation
with the New Orleans Police Department (NOPD), see NOPD Consent Decree, CITY NEW ORLEANS,
http://www.nola.gov/nopd/nopd-consent-decree/ (describing the failures of NOPD when responding to
allegations of rape and other gender-based violence).
23. See the examples given in DOJ Gender Bias Guidance, supra note 19, at 12-13 (including police
officers asking questions like "[w]hat did you think was going to happen after you went to his room
alone?"). See also Coker et al., supra note 13, at 3-4.
24. See, e.g., DOJ Gender Bias Guidance, supra note 19, at 12-13 (implying, through examples of
egregious behavior and standards set to counter it, that egregious behavior is largely or solely at fault for
deterring victims).
25. This Note does not focus on improving dramatically underperforming police departments
because insightful work on that topic exists already. For work on preventing the misclassification of rape
allegations, see Rape in the United States: The Chronic Failure to Report and Investigate Rape Cases:
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Crime and Drugs of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 11 Ith Cong. (2010)
(statement of Carol E. Tracy, Exec. Dir., Women's Law Project). For research and recommendations on
minimizing the role of implicit bias in rape investigations, see Joanne Archambault, The Preliminary
Sexual Assault Investigation, SAN DIEGO POLICE DEP'T (May 3, 2001),
http://www.sandiego.gov/police/pdf/preliminary.pdf; Identifying and Preventing Gender Bias in Law
Enforcement Response to Sexual Assault and Domestic Violence, POLICE EXECUTIVE RES. F. (Jan. 2016),
http://ric-zai-inc.com/Publications/cops-w0796-pub.pdf; Improving the Police Response to Sexual
Assault, POLICE EXECUTIVE RES. F. (Mar. 2012),
http://www.policeforum.org/assets/docs/Critical_1ssuesSeries/improving%20the%20police%20respons
e%20to%20sexual%20assault/o202012.pdf; OnLine Training Institute, END VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN
INT'L, http://www.evawintl.org/onlinetraining.aspx.
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victims because they adopt subtler but still pervasive patterns of detective
behavior that demonstrate skepticism to rape victims about their rape. The
specific behavior uncovered in this Note is the detectives' imposition of what
this Note calls "rape process templates."26 These "templates" are unwritten; they
reflect implicit assumptions about how rape investigations proceed that
detectives unconsciously develop based on their experience with rape
investigations and prosecutions and on their internalization of societal views on
rape and its verifiability. Detectives who rely on these templates do not use the
blatantly false rape myths or derogatory language of overtly biased departments.
Instead, they impose seemingly neutral templates onto rape investigations that
nevertheless echo traditional rape myths and traditional skepticism of rape
victims. Such skepticism, when expressed to victims, stops them from reporting
their rape. This chain creates a cycle that confirms the biases about rape
allegations that underlie the templates.
Rape process templates are similar to implicit biases in that they have an
unconscious effect on behavior, but they are unlike implicit biases in that they
are articulated explicitly to rape victims. The aspects of the templates that remain
implicit are the subject of this Note: how these templates arise from unstated
assumptions about rape allegations, how they channel investigations to produce
certain, predetermined results, and how they transform and thus preserve historic
skepticism of rape victims despite (or because of) their facial neutrality. The Note
begins in Part I by explaining the research methodology. Part II raises the puzzle
that the Note seeks to solve: why are victims' experiences with police at odds
with the efforts police make to encourage victims? Part III provides an answer:
it explains the rape process templates and examines their effect on rape victims.
Part IV explores how these templates both further entrench the skepticism that
rape victims face throughout the criminal justice process and preempt legal
change regarding what allegations are thought to be "provable." Finally, Part V
suggests that outside systems of oversight best limit the deployment of rape
process templates and thus should be used more widely.
I. METHODOLOGY
The research for this Note involved a case study of two police departments
in a mid-sized city in Connecticut. The two police departments operate in the
same city, but one department is the city police department (CPD) and one is the
local university's campus police department (UPD).27 The research from this
26. The "templates" also could be called "narratives," "heuristics," "tropes," "assumptions,"
"outlines," or "stereotypes." The Note adopts the term "templates" because that term best conveys the
procedurally oriented, preset, and determinative nature of the templates. The term "templates" does not
imply that these are written checklists, however, because they are not.
27. The identities of the police departments studied are not disclosed to protect the confidentiality
of the detectives. The roles are also described only as "detective" and "supervisor" without more detail on
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case study provides generalizable insights because the city's demographics make
it typical of similarly sized American cities. Around 50% of the residents are
white,28 around 30% attended college,29 and over 60% are employed.30 There is
meaningful income inequality between the relatively wealthy white population
and the relatively poor non-white population.31 The UPD is representative of
university police departments in its focus on campus policing, its receipt of
funding from the university, and its liability under Title IX of the Civil Rights
Act Amendments ("Title IX").
The research included fifteen unstructured interviews with and observations
of detectives, supervisors, victim advocates, and inspectors at the UPD, CPD,
and the local State's Attorney Office. Eight detectives and supervisors in the
CPD Special Victims Unit (SVU) were interviewed, some multiple times.
Detectives run the day-to-day investigations, interviewing victims, witnesses,
and alleged rapists, and gathering forensic evidence (such as rape kits,
surveillance video, and phone records). They draft arrest warrants, submit them
to prosecutors, and, based on the prosecutors' decisions, either execute an arrest
warrant or close the case. Junior SVU supervisors assign cases either to SVU
detectives or to unspecialized officers based on the facts in the allegation, oversee
SVU investigations, and manage detectives' training and caseloads. The more
senior supervisors rarely interact with victims or detectives but design the
process that victims follow when reporting rape and allocate resources to the
SVU.
Employees at three different local victim services organizations also were
interviewed to provide an outside perspective on the CPD. One organization
worked closely with the CPD, while another represented reporting victims in the
investigatory process, which often put the organization in a position adversarial
to the CPD. Together, these organizations represent hundreds of rape victims in
the city. Each advocate interviewed worked directly with rape victims on their
decision to report and their experience of reporting.
The research also compared the UPD to the CPD. Three detectives and
supervisors in the UPD Investigative Services Unit, half of the department at the
the precise roles to protect the officers' confidentiality even further. The citations that would reveal the
city and university where the research took place are adjusted to retain the anonymity of the departments.
Brackets indicate removed material. As much as possible of the citation is retained. For further information
on the citations, contact the author and the Yale Journal of Law and Feminism at
lawandfeminism@yale.edu.
28. QuickFacts: [City], Connecticut, 2014, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU [link removed]. This is a high
percentage of nonwhite people compared to America as a whole (which is 72% white), but not compared
to most cities.
29. Id. (noting that 34% of the city's population attended college, compared to 29% nationwide).
30. Id. (noting that 65% of the city's population are in the labor force, compared to 64%
nationwide).
31. Natalie Holmes & Alan Berube, City and Metropolitan Inequality on the Rise, Driven by
Declining Incomes, BROOKINGS INST. (Jan. 14, 2016), https://www.brookings.edu/research/city-and-
metropolitan-inequality-on-the-rise-driven-by-declining-incomes/.
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time, were interviewed, some twice. As in the CPD, the UPD detectives
conduct the day-to-day investigations of rape allegations. In addition, they
accompany victims to the hospital for rape kit testing and explain to victims both
the criminal justice and university-specific options available. In these interviews,
detectives and supervisors frequently referred to the best practices in this area
codified by the Police Executive Research Forum (PERF). The PERF research
thus provided additional insight into the UJPD's operations.33
The interviews were qualitative and open-ended; rather than yielding
empirical results, they provided insight into detectives' subtle behaviors and
messages regarding rape victims. The interviews lasted around one and a half
hours and mostly were conducted in the employees' offices (with two by
telephone).34 The interviews included questions about the interviewees' role in
the investigative process, their views on why victims tend not to report rape to
police, and what they would change in the reporting and investigative process.35
The questions aimed to prompt detectives to express opinions that they might not
consciously identify or articulate. To elicit brief roleplay-type answers,
interviewees were asked "How would you explain this to a victim?" or "What
would you say to a victim in that situation?" The broad questions, the author's
repeated visits, and instructions from the chiefs of the CPD and UPD to the SVU
officers to cooperate fully with the interviews encouraged honest responses from
the detectives and supervisors. The Note frequently uses quotations from these
interviews because the quotations reveal the subtle behaviors and messages that
detectives and supervisors adopt in reality, but would not mention if asked to
describe their own behavior in a self-reported, rather than conversational,
context.36 All together, the research provided multiple vantage points on the CPD
and the UPD.
32. [Citation to the [University] Police Dep't's webpage removed.]
33. Identifying and Preventing Gender Bias, supra note 19, at v; Improving the Police Response,
supra note 25.
34. These interviews covered the reporting process only for adult rape victims because the process
for minors is different. Victims over sixteen years old are considered adults in Connecticut. CONN. GEN.
STAT. §§ 53a-70(a)(2), 53a-71(a)(1) (2015). The process of reporting for minors is different because
teachers and other supervisors are mandatory reporters, so minors do not need to report rape directly to
the police for a criminal investigation to be opened.
35. The informal script for these interviews consisted of the following questions:
* What is your role with regard to rape victims?
* In your experience, why do victims not report or follow through with a report of
rape?
* What are victims' fears or concerns about the law enforcement process?
* How do you address those fears?
* What makes an investigation and/or case more likely to lead to a conviction? Where
do you see gaps between what police officers focus their investigations on and what
prosecutors expect to see in a case?
* How would you change the process for reporting and prosecuting rape?
36. A couple of outstanding detectives in the CPD did not deploy the templates and strongly
disavowed them when there were raised. None of the supervisors were outstanding in this regard. This
Note does not focus on the couple of detectives with exceptional attitudes and behaviors because they are
the exception; this Note aims to examine the more common behaviors in the CPD, which include frequent
use of the rape process templates.
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II. THE PUZZLE OF RAPE REPORTING
The CPD and its effect on victims illustrates the puzzle of rape reporting:
why do police departments that make great efforts to accommodate rape victims
still deter them from reporting? The CPD strives to respond well to victims of
rape: it operates within the typical constraints of a municipal police department
but still devotes significant resources to rape allegations. It polices around
150,000 people over twenty square miles37 on a budget of under $40 million.38 it
patrols a city that ranks among the highest in rates of violent crime for its size.39
Still, the CPD prioritizes rape investigations and rape victims: it re-created the
SVU and expanded it to include eight detectives;40 it emphasizes the Victim
Services Coordinator role;41 and it provides space in the police department
headquarters to the local branch of the state-sponsored Office of Victim Services
to facilitate victims' introduction to the organization.
The CPD SVU detectives are compassionate and skilled investigators. The
detectives help victims use the investigative process to recover. After observing
and interviewing the detectives for six months, a reporter lauded the dedication
of the detectives, describing them as steady and reassuring detectives who
compliment victims on their courage.42 As one detective explained, "I tell them:
when they came in, they were victims. When they leave, they are survivors."43
The detectives are also careful and thorough investigators. They send all rape
kits to the state lab for testing and then store the original kit and results
"indefinitely" or until the statute of limitations runs." They seek corroborating
evidence, even when it is not readily available and requires creativity to discover
(such as a distinctive mole on the penis of a rapist, which was visible only when
the penis was erect and thus provided evidence that discredited his claim that he
had never had sex with the victim, who described the mole perfectly).4 5
Yet despite these exemplary practices, the detectives' compassion and skill
do not translate into a positive experience for the victims who report their rape
to the CPD. The city appears to match the low national average in the rate at
37. QuickFacts, supra note 28.
38. Mayor's Proposed Budget for Fiscal Year 2016/2017, [City], Connecticut, [CITY] OFFICE OF
THE MAYOR §§ 1-12, 1-19 (Mar. 1, 2016) [link removed].
39. [Citation to local newspaper article from Feb. 2014 removed].
40. Interview with [City] Police Dep't Special Victims Unit Supervisors, in [City], Conn. (Apr. 5,
2016). See also [citations to local newspapers removed].
41. Interview with [City] Police Dep't Special Victims Unit Supervisors, in [City], Conn. (Feb. 12,
2016); [citation to local newspaper articles from Apr. 2013 removed].
42. [Citation to New York Times article from Jan. 2016 removed].
43. Interview with [City] Police Dep't Special Victims Unit Detectives, in [City], Conn. (Mar. 9,
2016).
44. Interviews with [University] Police Dep't Supervisors, in [City], Conn. (Apr. 5, 2016). This is
in contrast to the nationwide problem of destroying rape kits without testing them. See Rape Kit Backlogs:
Failing the Test of Providing Justice to Sexual Assault Survivors: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Crime,
Terrorism, and Homeland Security of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. (2010).
45. Interview with [City] Police Dep't Special Victims Unit Detectives, supra note 43.
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which rape allegations result in convictions, though direct data is hard to find.4 6
More importantly, victims remember their experience with the CPD negatively
according to the victim services organizations. When asked to grade the CPD on
its interactions with rape victims during the reporting and investigation process,
one local victim services organization gave it a C-.47 Another gave it a D, with
the caveat that "that's probably being kind." 8 A third reported that victims are
.,"not satisfied" with the CPD response.49 Victims expected that the CPD would
be "more sympathetic" and "provide a less biased response" than it did.o
According to the victim advocates, "victims feel like they're being judged,
looked down on, and that police don't believe them." 1 The police response
"ma[kes] it impossible [for victims] to deal with the whole system because it [is]
too painful."52 One advocate recounted an instance in which a victim was making
an initial report and the officers "did nearly everything wrong:" the responding
officer "could not have acted more bored. Could not have cared less about what
happened.... He didn't even have a pad of paper to take notes."53 In SUm,
somehow the efforts of the CPD and its detectives do not translate into better
experiences for victims.
The UPD provides an insightful comparison with the CPD because the
UPD's efforts to accommodate rape victims appear to be more fruitful. The UPD
also responds frequently to sex crimes, which are some of the most common
crimes on university campuses.54 It devotes even more resources to policing rape
than the CPD does, in part because it has far more resources and in part because
its policing of rape is subject to greater oversight. In terms of resources, the UPD
polices around 30,000 university-affiliated people, fewer than half of whom live
46. On average nationally, only 25 to 30% of rape allegations reported to the police proceed to
prosecution. Truman & Langton, supra note 1. A UPD supervisor estimated that the UPD receives twenty
to thirty allegations of rape and sexual assault per week. Interview with [City] Police Dep't Special
Victims Unit Supervisor, in [City], Conn. (Feb. 24, 2016). If that were a typical rate, it would result in
around 1,000 rape allegations per year; however, a search of all Connecticut criminal cases originating in
the city in that year revealed only one sexual assault case. Search on Westlaw: within Connecticut state
cases, "advanced: PR('[city]')" and "after: 06-01-2015."
47. Telephone interview with employee at victim-oriented nonprofit (Mar. 31, 2016).
48. Telephone interview with employee at victim-oriented nonprofit (Apr. 1, 2016).
49. Interview with employee at victim-oriented nonprofit, in [City], Conn. (Mar. 28, 2016).
50. Telephone interview with victim-oriented nonprofit, supra note 48.
51. Id.
52. Interview with victim-oriented nonprofit, supra note 49; Telephone interviews with victim-
oriented nonprofits, supra notes 47-48.
53. Telephone interview with victim-oriented nonprofit, supra note 47.
54. See Campus Safety and Security Survey, U.S. DEP'T EDUC.,
http://ope.ed.gov/campussafety/Trend/public/#/answer/3/301/main?row--1 &column=- I (reporting that
in 2014, there were 49,870 general crimes reported over 11,611 university campuses, 33% (16,709) of
which were offenses under the Violence Against Women Act); Crime in Schools and Colleges: A Study
of Offenders and Arrestees Reported via National Incident-Based Reporting System Data, Uniform Crime
Statistics, Federal Bureau of Investigation, FED. BUREAU INVESTIGATION app.,
https://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ucr/nibrs/crime-in-schools-and-colleges (li ting sex crimes in the top
five most common violent crimes on campus).
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on the downtown campus, which is only half a square mile." The department
has an annual budget of over $10 million for this task.
In terms of oversight, the UPD, unlike the CPD, is part of a university and
thus is subject to Title IX.1 7 Title IX forbids discrimination "on the basis of sex"
in educational institutions that receive federal funding. 8 To meet Title IX
standards, the university must investigate and remediate any sexual assault or
harassment that it knows of or should have known of.59 Because Title IX subjects
universities to liability (private litigation for damages)60 and financial
consequences (revocation of federal funding) if they fail to remedy known
discrimination,6 the university has great incentive to comply with Title IX. From
2011 to 2012, the Department of Education's Office of Civil Rights (OCR),
which enforces Title IX, investigated the university with which the UJPD is
associated for violations of Title IX. 62 As a result of this investigation, the
university's Office of the General Counsel now reviews the UPD's classification
of rape allegations, giving the Office substantial oversight over the UPD's
operations in this area.63 As a UPD supervisor noted, "audits keep people honest
[and] the university faces much greater scrutiny [now]." 64
In addition, as mandated by the Resolution Agreement between the
university and the OCR that lists the changes that the university must adopt to
comply with Title IX, the university created an internal disciplinary system to
adjudicate rape allegations and a confidential resource center for university
affiliates, instituted ongoing training for all UPD members on trauma-informed
interviewing and investigative techniques, and began conducting periodic
assessments of the campus climate.65 The UPD also created the role of
coordinator for all sensitive crimes and put the coordinator partially in charge of
55. [University.] Facts and Statistics, [UNIVERSITY WEBPAGE] (2016), [link removed].
56. [Citation to an article in the university's alumni magazine from Mar./Apr. 2008 removed].
57. 20 U.S.C. § 1687 (2012); Office for Civil Rights, Dear Colleague Letter from Secretary of
Education John B. King Jr., U.S. DEP'T EDUC. (2016), http://www2.ed.gov/documents/press-
releases/campus-policing-letter.pdf.
58. 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (2012).
59. See Jackson v. Birmingham Bd. of Educ., 544 U.S. 167, 173 (2005); Davis ex rel. LaShonda D.
v. Monroe Cty. Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 633 (1999); Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S.
274, 290 (1998); Office for Civil Rights, Dear Colleague Letter from Assistant Secretary for Civil Rights
Russlynn Ali, U.S. DEP'T EDUC. 3 (2011), https://www2.ed.gov/aboutloffices/list/ocr/letters/colleague-
201104.pdf.
60. Fitzgerald v. Barnstable Sch. Comm., 555 U.S. 246, 255 (2009) (citing Cannon v. Univ. of Chi.,
441 U.S. 677, 717 (1979)).
61. 20 U.S.C.§ 1681(a) (2012).
62. Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Educ., U.S. Department of Education Announces Resolution of []
University Civil Rights Investigation (June [], 2012), [link removed].
63. Interview with [University] Police Dep't Supervisors, in [City], Conn. (Mar. 30, 2016);
Interview with [University] Police Dep't Supervisors, supra note 44.
64. Interview with [University] Police Dep't Supervisors, supra note 63.
65. Compliance Resolution Letter from Reg'l Dir. Thomas J. Hibino, Office for Civil Rights, to
[University's General Counsel] (June [1, 2012), [link removed]; Voluntary Resolution Agreement,
[UNIVERSITY] (June [], 2012), [linked removed].
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the Investigations Department.66 The UPD created a partnership with the
confidential resource center67 that includes having the center provide the UPD
with anonymized and generalized feedback about victims' experiences with the
UPD." The UPD's efforts to lower the stakes of a victim's initial reporting
decision and to receive periodic feedback on its interactions with victims produce
investigations that are both more successful and more responsive to victims'
needs.
The Title IX regime renders the environment in which the UPD operates
sufficiently different from that of the CPD to make it a fruitful comparison
regarding the detectives' deployment of rape process templates. The UPD is an
environment in which detectives are closely scrutinized, regularly trained, and
informed of their effect on victims through campus climate surveys and the
feedback from the resource center. This appears to have meaningful
consequences on victims' satisfaction rates.
Victims who interact with the UPD appear to be more satisfied with their
experience than those who interact with the CPD based on the results of a 2015
confidential survey on sexual assault at the university, called the AAU Survey.69
Almost twice the percentage of student rape victims who report to the CPD
(5.8%) report to the JPD (11.4%),70 and the rate of reporting to the UPD as
compared to the CPD has risen since 2013.71 Because university students who
decide to report their rape often can choose whether to report to the JPD or the
CPD, the UPD reporting rate indicates a preference for eporting to the UPD over
the CPD. Additionally, the survey found that "no students reported being
pressured by any official [including the UPD] to drop or abandon a complaint."72
That perception is in direct opposition to rape victims' qualitative perception of
the CPD73 and to their responses in the AAU survey, where some stated that they
felt pressure "not to proceed" from the CPD.74 Furthermore, all respondents said
that the CPD was "not at all" useful to them during a rape report or investigation,
66. Interview with [University] Police Dep't Supervisors, supra note 63; Interview with
[University] Police Dep't Supervisors, supra note 44.
67. [Citation to the university's confidential resource center webpage removed.]
68. Id.
69. David Cantor et al., Report on the AA U Campus Climate Survey on Sexual Assault and Sexual
Misconduct, [UNIVERSITY] 2-3, 9-10 (Sept. [], 2015), [link removed].
70. [Citation to university's introduction to the AAU survey removed.]
71. David Cantor et al., Westat-f/niversity] Data Tables for the AAU Campus Climate Survey,
[UNIVERSITY] tbl.3.9c (Sept. [], 2015), [link removed]. The data tables report "s" for the category of felt
pressure "not to proceed" from the CPD, compared with "-" for that category for the UPD. While "-"
means that no respondents gave that response, "s" means that the cell has been "suppressed because of
small sample size" in order to promote confidentiality - that is, that a small number of respondents gave
that response. Cantor et al., supra note 69, at 10.
72. [University's introduction to the AAU survey], supra note 70, at 10.
73. See supra notes 46-52 and accompanying text.
74. Cantor et al., supra note 71, at tbl.3.9c. This aligns with the UPD detective's explanation that
she views her first meeting with the victim as an "information session" with the victim and not as a time
to pressure the victim into a choice. Interview with [University] Police Dep't Supervisors, supra note 63.
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while some said that the UPD was "somewhat" useful. In response to the
question of how respectful the department was toward the victim and how helpful
the police were in telling victims their options, none said the CPD was
"excellent" on either score, while some said the UPD was "excellent" on both.76
The research suggests hat although they care deeply about rape victims and
can conduct effective investigations, the CPD SVU detectives somehow
discourage victims from reporting or pursuing their allegations of rape. This is
not inevitable, as the comparison to the UPD shows. The next section examines
one way that the research revealed that police officers in the CPD discourage
victims: through their imposition of rape process templates onto investigations.
III. RAPE PROCESS TEMPLATES
A. The Templates: "He Said, She Said" and "Brutal Cross-Examination"
The case study revealed that even in a police department like the CPD that
expresses no explicit skepticism about rape allegations, detectives still convey
an implicit skepticism about them to rape victims. One way that detectives do
this is by imposing their own mental templates about how the investigations will
proceed onto the allegations. This Note names these expectations "rape process
templates." Unlike rape myths that question victims' experience of rape itself,
these unwritten templates or heuristics set expectations about the criminal justice
system's response to victims' allegations of rape. Detectives deploy these
templates presumptively, in effect predicting that the police investigation and
legal outcome of each rape allegation will match those constructed by the
templates. Although they are occasionally accurate descriptions of rape cases,
these templates often are not: they encourage detectives to discount rape victims'
own narratives in favor of these predictive ones. They also justify any implicit
skepticism detectives have about the provability of rape accusations. Overall,
rape process templates distort the investigatory process.
The two rape process templates identified here are the "he said, she said"
and the "brutal cross-examination" templates. As explained in detectives' own
words, the "he said, she said" template states that in rape cases, the only
meaningful evidence is the victim's accusation of rape ("she said") and the
75. Cantor et al., supra note 71, at tbl.3.9c. This finding also is mirrored by the survey responses of
victims of intimate partner violence (IPV), which is another form of gender-based violence and thus
sufficiently analogous to rape to bolster the survey's findings on rape victims. No IPV victims reported
that the UPD was "not at all" useful, and over 50% reported that they were "very" or "extremely" useful,
while 68% reported that the CPD was "not at all" useful and none reporting that they were "very" or
"extremely" useful. Id. at tbl.5.2b.
76. Cantor et al., supra note 71, at tbl.3.9c.
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alleged rapist's denial of it ("he said").n Outside of the context of rape, this is
called a "swearing contest" because at trial, the victim and defendant each swear
an oath and then recount their version of the event. The "he said, she said"
framing of rape, however, adds an element that the "swearing contests" framing
lacks: predefined roles and narratives set by gender. This trope creates the
expectation that all rape cases will become swearing contests with roles defined
by gender because the "only evidence is the victim."78 An extreme version of
this template says that "physical evidence does not matter" in rape cases because
the alleged rapist always will claim the sex was consensual.79 According to this
version, even a rape case with physical evidence is a "he said, she said" case.
The second template, the "brutal cross-examination" template, also assumes
that rape cases inevitably lack evidence corroborating victims' testimony. This
template says that because the case at trial "depends entirely on how credible the
victim is," defense attorneys will ensure that the victims' "cross-examination[s]
will be brutal."80 Anticipating a brutal cross-examination, victims may appear
unsympathetic on the stand, refuse to testify, or recant their allegations because
they "don't want to expose themselves."8 1 Without a sympathetic victim
testifying, the template says, the jury will acquit.
The two templates work together. They share assumptions about what make
a rape provable to someone-a prosecutor, judge, or jury-in the later stages of
the criminal justice process. They tend to be deployed together to explain or
justify to victims, detectives, or prosecutors how the investigation and
prosecution will proceed, which often includes preemptively explaining to
victims why they may or will stop pursuing their allegation.82 They are invoked
from the start of the investigation, often the very day the victim reports,83 through
the end, when the prosecutors decide whether to sign the arrest warrant.8 4 Often,
even when only one template is explicitly stated, the other is implicitly evoked.
For example, a detective may say that without physical evidence (here, the "he
said, she said" template is implicitly imposed), the cross examination will focus
solely on the victim's character and thus be particularly brutal (and here the
"brutal cross-examination" template is explicitly applied) so the victim should
consider carefully if she really wants to continue with her allegation.
77. The exact phrase "he said, she said" was used in six of the fifteen interviews conducted. In one,
the term "date rape" was used to express the same idea, that is, the assumption that there would be no
corroborating evidence of a rape allegation because of the type of crime rape is.




82. Id.; Interview with [City] Police Dep't Special Victims Unit Supervisors, supra note 46.
83. See infra notes 94-97 and accompanying text.
84. See infra notes 102-107 and accompanying text.
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The templates are misleading, even though they are not "rape myths" that
are entirely wrong." For unlike rape myths, the templates occasionally describe
a case accurately. For example, a rape case that hinges on the question of consent
(not the existence of sex) in which the rape occurred long ago and the victim told
no one at the time may result in a swearing contest. But, in the view of the
experienced detectives who do not adopt the templates, even in those cases,
"'[h]e said/she said' is a weak excuse for a poor investigation. It is never 'he
said/she said.'"6 Even when "there's no [forensic] evidence. . . , it's all about
corroboration to fit the puzzle together and create a picture the juries can see."87
Finding corroborating evidence-such as text messages, "any stored
communications," or credit card statements8 -is a matter of experience and
dedication.8 1 Particularly inaccurate according to these detectives is the
template's assumption that all rape cases lack definitive forensic evidence. In
reality, "[e]very [case] is very different. Some happen where there are
cameras."90
There is a similarly misleading dynamic in the "brutal cross-examination"
template. Rape prosecutions tend to be stronger at trial when the victim
testifies.91 And when the victim testifies, the cross-examination often is intense,
painful, and humiliating.92 But only a tiny fraction of charged rape cases-fewer
85. An example of a rape myth that is entirely wrong is the myth that rape victims cannot get
pregnant from rape. There are politicians who promote this myth today. Becca Andrews, There Are Still
Politicians Who Think You Can't Get Pregnant From Rape, MOTHER JONES (Feb. 29, 2016),
www.motherjones.com/polities/2016/02/idaho-lawmaker-still-thinks-rape-cant-result-pregnancy-and-its-
2016. Credible science has proven, however, that "rape and consensual sex have the same pregnancy rate."
Kate Clancy, Here Is Some Legitimate Science on Pregnancy and Rape, SC. AM. (Aug. 20, 2012),
http:/Iblogs.scientificamerican.com/context-and-variation/here-is-some-legitimate-science-on-
pregnancy-and-rape/.
86. Interview with [University] Police Dep't Supervisors, supra note 63.
87. Interview with [City] Police Dep't Detectives, supra note 43; see also New York Times article,
supra note 42.
88. Interview with [City] Police Dep't Special Victims Unit Detectives, in [City], Conn. (Mar. 29,
2016); Interview with [University] Police Dep't Supervisors, supra note 63.
89. Interview with [City] Police Dep't Special Victims Unit Detectives, supra note 43.
90. Id.; see also interview with [University] Police Dep't Supervisors, supra note 63 ("[T]here is no
typical sex assault.").
91. Gena L. Durham, The Domestic Violence Dilemma, 71 S. CAL. L. REV. 641, 654 (1998); James
J. Gobert, Victim Precipitation, 77 COLUM. L. REV. 511, 537 (1977) (noting that when a victim does not
testify, it "decreas[es] the likelihood of conviction"). The perceived importance of a rape victim testifying
at trial has existed for over a century. See William Reynolds, The Remedy for Lynch Law, 7 YALE L.J. 20,
21 (1897) ("In cases of rape and attempted rape it is rarely possible to obtain sufficient evidence to justify
a committal or indictment, much less a conviction, without the testimony of the woman who has been
assaulted.").
92. See Bell v. Harrison, 670 F.2d 656, 658 (6th Cir. 1982) ("The rationale behind [rape shield]
statutes is that evidence [at trial] of a rape victim's prior sexual activity is of dubious probative value and
relevance and is highly embarrassing and prejudicial. Often such evidence has been used to harass the
prosecuting victim."); Vivian Berger, Man's Trial, Woman 's Tribulation: Rape Cases in the Courtroom,
77 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 13-14 (1977) (For rape victims, "[c]ross-examination by the defense may prove to
be extremely grueling" as well as "personal or embarrassing." The harshness of the cross-examination is
hard to prove, though, because "a cold record can never convey counsel's harsh or insinuating tone or
expression of utter incredulity."); Laura F. Boeschen et. al., Rape Trauma Experts in the Courtroom, 4
PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 414 (1998); see also Catharine A. MacKinnon, Feminism, Marxism, Method,
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than eight percent-go to trial.93 Thus, for most cases, warning the victim about
the cross-examination in the early days of an investigation is unnecessary. Why,
then, do police officers raise the topic so often?
It is typically supervisors who raise the topic, and they justify doing so as
part of their "duty to be transparent" with victims so that they can conserve the
department's resources for rape allegations that will result in successful
prosecutions.94 Perhaps surprisingly, given that a trial is years away at this point,
the template often is deployed in the first call with victims, within hours of their
initial report. A supervisor explained that she calls victims immediately after they
report their rape, before deciding whether to assign their investigation to a
qualified SVU detective or less qualified patrol officer (a decision that greatly
affects the quality of the investigation and thus the outcome of the case), to "ask
her if she really wants to move forward. Because we don't have that many
resources." On the call, she "tell[s] the [victims] their chances, as raw as they
come. If they don't like it, they don't want to hear the truth." She is particularly
"honest" about a victim's "chances" when the rape involved "drugs, alcohol, or
domestic violence."95 This supervisor believes that when a victim drops her
allegation after this call, it casts doubt on "whether the victim really wants
services."96 This view allows the supervisor to see the victim's decision as
confirmation that her aggressive questioning is necessary to conserve department
resources rather than seeing the decision as a reaction to her aggressive and
skeptical questioning.97
The "he said, she said" template also allows detectives to overlook the effect
of their actions on victims and investigations. Detectives believe that they
disassociate their personal beliefs from their investigations when they use the "he
said, she said" template. The detectives are certain that in investigations "it's not
what we believe, but what we can prove."98 The detectives say that their belief
about the allegations is irrelevant: "even if I don't believe [the victim], I'm going
to work the case. And as bizarre as [the allegation] seems, it could have
happened."99 They have been trained to think that what they believe is
independent from what they can prove: the same supervisor who said that
and the State, 8 SIGNs 635, 651 (1983) ("Rather than deterring or avenging rape, the state, in many
victims' experiences, perpetuates it. Women who charge rape say they were raped twice, the second time
in court.").
93. Daly & Bouhours, supra note 10; Sourcebook of Criminal Justice Statistics Online, supra note
10.
94. Interview with [City] Police Dep't Special Victims Unit Supervisors, supra note 41.
95. Interview with [City] Police Dep't Special Victims Unit Supervisors, supra note 46.
96. Interview with [City] Police Dep't Special Victims Unit Supervisors, supra note 41.
97. Interview with [City] Police Dep't Special Victims Unit Supervisors, supra note 40. Victim
advocates mentioned that raising the question of whether a victim will drop out to her is highly problematic
because it makes her starting questioning why other victims drop out and whether she should drop out as
well. Interviews with victim-oriented nonprofit, supra note 49.
98. Interview with [City] Police Dep't Special Victims Unit Supervisors, supra note 41.
99. Interview with [City] Police Dep't Special Victims Unit Detectives, supra note 88.
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"physical evidence does not matter" because all rape cases end up as "he said,
she said" cases explained that supervisors tell victims that they need physical
evidence to pursue an allegation because "we believe [them], but need to show
the court that [their accusation] is true."o00 In reality, there is no requirement of
physical evidence either in the standard for an arrest warrant or in the legal
definition of rape.10 1 The "he said, she said" template excuses the supervisor's
imposition of his "personal belief' about the provability of rape onto the victim's
allegation by framing his belief in terms of the evidence "the court" needs despite
the disconnect of the narrative from the legal standards.
Even when detectives disavow them, the templates still create a self-
fulfilling cycle. Detectives expect prosecutors not to sign arrest warrants for
cases that prosecutors are "going to have to fight to prove" because "they don't
want a loss under their belt." 02 Detectives believe that prosecutors are wary of
rape cases because the prosecutors fear that jurors also apply the "he said, she
said" template onto rape cases and thus that they must present physical evidence
or a testifying victim to overcome the jurors' skepticism. Specifically, based on
their experiences with arrest warrants that prosecutors refused to sign,03
detectives conclude that "prosecutors want a rape kit" or DNA evidence.
Appeal to SVU supervisors on denied arrest warrants is ineffective because the
supervisors, further from the daily reality of investigations, more uniformly
apply the "he said, she said" template.'0 5
These impediments discourage detectives and train them to approach messy
or unusual rape allegations with less vigor. When they expect that the prosecutor
will reject an arrest warrant, even if they believe in the case, the detectives devote
100. Id.
101. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-70(a) (West, Westlaw through Jan. 1, 2017) (defining
rape); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 54-2a(a) (West, Westlaw through Jan. 1, 2017) (setting for the standard
for an arrest warrant).
102. Interview with [City] Police Dep't Special Victims Unit Detectives, supra note 88.
103. All the CPD detectives interviewed had investigated cases that they believe had sufficient
corroborating evidence to justify an arrest warrant, but that prosecutors had refused to sign arrest warrants
for.
104. Interview with [City] Police Dep't Special Victims Unit Detectives, supra note 88
("[P]rosecutors almost always take [the case] when there's a DNA hit from rape."). It is possible that
detectives use this explanation to shift the blame for insufficient investigations and unsigned arrest
warrants onto prosecutors. But interviews with the inspector in the local State's Attorney Office make that
theory seem unlikely. The inspector in the local State's Attorney Office is a retired police detective, with
no legal training, who reviews the arrest warrants for prosecutors to determine if there is sufficient
evidence to support an arrest warrant. He can reject an arrest warrant without a prosecutor ever seeing it.
In an interview, he said that he "personally believe[s] it is hard to prosecute these [rape] cases" because
"[h]e said / she said happens every day." He prefers cases with physical evidence, yet also discounts the
physical evidence available: "with sexual assault, physical evidence will not have the same meaning," he
believes, because the alleged rapist always says the sex was consensual. The inspector's personal beliefs
and preferences carry great weight in his evaluation of applications because there is no checklist or set of
guidelines that he must follow when he evaluates applications for arrest warrants. He believes that with
regard to evaluating evidence in rape cases, "[i]f you do it enough, you don't need a checklist as a
guidance." Interview with employee at State's Attorney Office, [City], Conn. (Mar. 3, 2016).
105. Interviews with [City] Police Dep't Special Victims Unit, supra notes 40, 41, 46.
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less time and fewer resources to uncovering the corroborating evidence in the
case. This produces a weaker case, which prosecutors then reject.106 This process
confirms detectives' perception that prosecutors will not pursue messy or
unusual rape cases and prosecutors' belief that messy or unusual rape cases lack
corroborating evidence.'0 7
Biased detectives may use the templates intentionally to discourage victims.
Detectives know well that "[i]f [detectives] don't want the case, it's easy to
convince the victim that it was their fault and to retract the case."'io This
intentional use is rare in the CPD: when asked about such behavior, the detectives
called in their supervisor to recount when a detective in the department ("a piece
of shit," the supervisor called him) was found to be blaming and discouraging
victims. He was sent to the Chief to be disciplined and was removed from the
Investigations Unit.1 09
But even in the CPD, where detectives pride themselves on their rejection of
the explicit biases that underlie the templates, the detectives and supervisors are
so steeped in the templates that they apply too stringent a screen on which cases
to investigate. They do not see how this screening process trengthens the cycle
they disavowed. Detectives learn to expect when it is unlikely that a prosecutor
will sign an arrest warrant even though they, the detectives, believe the evidence
is sufficient."0 But the detectives do not push the prosecutors to sign the arrest
warrants. Instead, they close a case based on the prosecutor's hinted disapproval
because the "he said, she said" and "brutal cross-examination" templates imply
that prosecutors are right to take on only the most provable cases."' These
narratives justify the detectives' acquiescence and let them dodge the question
106. Interview with [City] Police Dep't Special Victims Unit Detectives, supra note 88. The CPD
detectives are thoughtful about how they close an investigation. A detective explained that when she
closed an investigation, she called the victim and explained to her that the "case is closed until we receive
any further information. If you get more information, call us and we'll pick it up again." Id.
107. Id.; see also [New York Times article], supra note 42.
108. Interview with [City] Police Dep't Special Victims Unit Detectives, supra note 43. The fact
that police officers can manipulate victims so easily, according to an exceptional detective who does not
adopt the rape process templates, is "the reason this has to be a special unit. You need to have people who
have pride in the work they do and who want to do these cases." Id.; Interview with [City] Police Dep't
Special Victims Unit Detectives, supra note 88. See also [New York Times article], supra note 42.
109. Interview with [City] Police Dep't Special Victims Unit Detectives, supra note 88; Interview
with [City] Police Dep't Special Victims Unit Supervisor, in [City], Conn. (Mar. 29, 2016).
110. The legal standard for an arrest warrant is probable cause. U.S. CONST. amend. IV ("[N]o
warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause."); see also CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 54-2a(a) (West,
Westlaw through Jan. 1, 2017) (A court may issue "bench warrants of arrest upon application by a
prosecutorial official if the court or judge determines that the affidavit accompanying the application
shows that there is probable cause to believe that an offense has been committed and that the person
complained against committed it."). The standard is not beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Usry, 205
Conn. 298, 312 (1987) ("Even though the recited facts may not be sufficient to establish beyond a
reasonable doubt that the defendant was guilty of the crimes charged . .. they establish a substantial basis
for the magistrate's finding of probable cause for the defendant's arrest."); see also Nez v. United States,
365 F.2d 286, 287-88 (10th Cir. 1966) (holding that an "oral statement by the victim," along with some
corroborating evidence, is sufficient probable cause for an arrest warrant related to an allegation of rape).
111. See supra notes 102-107 and accompanying text.
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of whether they believe the victim and whether they could have conducted a more
thorough investigation. Detectives generally want to both help victims and
produce successful investigations, so a justification that appears to be neutral and
inevitable is appealing to detectives when prosecutors or detectives drop
plausible allegations.l1 2
Use of rape process templates is not inevitable or necessary. The comparison
of the CPD and the UPD reveals that investigations can proceed without the
templates. It appears that the UPD detectives very rarely deploy rape process
templates. When asked about the templates in interviews (not as "the templates,"
but as the "he said, she said" and "brutal cross-examination" narratives), the UPD
detectives strongly disavowed them.113  They also never raised them
spontaneously as an explanation for certain behaviors or results, as the CPD
supervisors did.'14 More broadly, the UPD detectives see successful policing of
rape as critical to their department's success. In the words of one supervisor, "It's
one thing to take a gun off the street. It's another thing to fail a victim. If the men
and women on the front line do not have the tools to respond to sexual assault or
gender violence, then the department will only be partially successful.""5
The UPD's disavowal of the templates is exemplified by the difference in
how the CPD and the UPD address the possibility that a prosecutor may not sign
an arrest warrant. In the CPD, the supervisor previews the possibility that the
prosecutor will not sign an arrest warrant as a test for the victim, to see if she is
serious about her complaint."l6 In the UPD, on the other hand, the supervisor
talks through all of victim's options at the beginning of the investigation, so that
the victim is aware that even if the prosecutor rejects the case, she still has
choices. If the prosecutor does reject the case, this early explanation allows the
supervisor to say, "We talked about this. Now we'll go to Plan B." The UPD
approach ensures that the victim does not view the prosecutor's decision as
embodying doubt about her allegation; in anticipating the potential need for a
Plan B, the UPD supervisor already implied that she still would believe the
victim even if this happened."7
The UPD supervisor often has more Plan Bs available than a CPD detective
has because there are university-based adjudication procedures for university-
112. This cycle is exacerbated by the fact that the CPD lacks funding to train detectives on a regular
basis. Supervisors believe that "there are so many cases and so many different cases here that that is a
form of training itself." Interview with [City] Police Dep't Special Victims Unit Supervisors, supra note
40. The problem with this approach to training is that when detectives learn only by investigating the cases
assigned to them, in conjunction with the same inspectors and prosecutors, they do not gain new
perspective on their approach. They miss the opportunity to have an outside speaker or new data challenge
the narratives and assumptions the entire department adopts regarding what rape allegations are provable.
113. See, e.g., Interview with [University] Police Dep't Supervisors, supra note 63.
114. For the CPD's use of these templates, see supra note 77-110 and accompanying text. For the
UPD's lack of use, see interview with [University] Police Dep't Supervisors, supra note 63.
115. Interview with [University] Police Dep't Supervisors, supra note 44.
116. See supra note 95 and accompanying text.
117. Interview with [University] Police Dep't Supervisors, supra note 63.
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related rape allegations. But that alone does not explain why the UPD supervisor
goes out of her way to ensure that the prosecutor's decision is not given
determinative weight. Instead, the UPD supervisor's explanation can be seen as
a direct counter to the assumptions underlying the templates: while a supervisor
who adopted the templates would fit the prosecutor's decision into the narrative
that rapes are unprovable and thus that the prosecutor's decision was correct, the
UPD supervisor offsets the implication that the prosecutor's decision was
inevitable or right and instead poses it as merely one stumbling block that a
victim can overcome.
The fact that the UPD rarely deploys rape process templates and that the
UPD victims are more satisfied with the UPD than the CPD victims are with the
CPD118 suggests that the use of rape process templates is not the inevitable result
of detectives' long tenure in the SVU or necessary to weed out false complaints.
The example of the UPD suggests that it is possible to have a police department
whose near elimination of rape process templates results in interactions with
victims that are far less discouraging.
B. The Effect of the Templates on Victims
The rape process templates effectively discourage victims from reporting
and pursuing their rape allegations in large part because they concern victims
who are already particularly susceptible to discouragement. Rape victims likely
hear questions about provability and credibility as expressing skepticism about
their rape because society primes rape victims to expect disbelief.19 This
priming exacerbates victims' perception that the templates transmit disbelief of
the allegation itself even though on their face the templates refer only to the
processes around rape prosecutions. Three contextual factors particularly can
arouse victims' expectations that they will be disbelieved and thus magnify the
discouraging effect the templates have on victims' decisions regarding reporting
rape.
First, most rape allegations pit a woman's allegation against a man's
denial2 0 and many women anticipate that their narrative will be drowned out by
a man's.121 When detectives suggest that the case will come down to a female
victim's story against her male rapist's story ("he said, she said"), as told by an
118. See supra note 70-76 and accompanying text.
119. See Michelle J. Anderson, The Legacy of the Prompt Complaint Requirement, Corroboration
Requirement, and Cautionary Instructions on Campus Sexual Assault, 84 B.U. L. REv. 945, 946-47
(2004).
120. Rape is usually of women by men. Twenty percent of women in the United States (23 million
women) have been raped, and 99% of them have had only male perpetrators. By contrast, only 1.7% of
men in the United States (two million) have been raped, also mostly by men. Breiding, supra note 4, at 2.
121. See Linda L. Carli, Gender and Social Influence, 57 J. Soc. ISSUES 725, 726 (2001) ("A meta-
analytic review of the results of 29 studies revealed that, in mixed-sex groups, men exert more influence
than women.").
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aggressive, male1 22 defense lawyer ("brutal cross-examination"), detectives tap
into the gendered dynamics of speech and credibility that victims may know well.
Second, victims who have heard the real rape myth may expect that any
allegation that does not match the real rape script will be discounted. Susan
Estrich identified this myth as saying that a "real rape" occurs when a "stranger
puts a gun to the head of his victim, threatens to kill her or beats her, and then
engages in intercourse."l23 All other rapes are viewed by police, prosecutors,
judges, and juries as misunderstood or regretted consensual sex.1 24 Victims may
have internalized this myth, in part because it is so widespread and in part
because it is easier to believe it than to acknowledge that women are so
vulnerable to rape, especially by men they know.1 25 Once they have internalized
this myth, victims compare their own rape to it and doubt themselves when their
rapes diverge from the script. As a UPD detective explained,
[I]t is very hard for someone to think of herself as a victim of sexual
assault... .Victims don't think twice about reporting a robbery. People
don't ask themselves, "Did I voluntarily give him the money?" People
don't get asked, "What did you expect? You were hold[ing] your phone
out in your hand." It's just different when someone walked you home
because you were a little drunk and you don't see yourself as a victim
of a sex assault.12 6
Already torn about what they believe themselves, victims fear having their
doubts confirmed by detectives, prosecutors, judges, and juries.1 27
Third, because the personal consequences of reporting can be so large, due
to stigma and risk of retaliation,128 and the benefits can be so small, the decision
122. Stephanie A. Scharg & Roberta D. Liebenberg, First Chairs at Trial: More Women Need Seats
at the Table, A.B.A. 13 (2015),
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/marketing/women/first-chairs20l5.authcheckdam.pdf
(reporting that 67% of defense lawyers in criminal cases are men and 79% of lawyers who appear at trial
are men).
123. Susan Estrich, Rape, 95 YALE L.J. 1087, 1092 (1986).
124. Id.
125. See, e.g., Howard N. Snyder, Sexual Assault of Young Children as Reported to Law
Enforcement: Victim, Incident, and Offender Characteristics, U.S. DEP'T JUST. 10 (July 2000),
https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/saycrle.pdf (reporting that over 90% of rapes of children and teens
are committed by someone the victim knows).
126. Interview with [University] Police Dep't Supervisors, supra note 63.
127. Interview with employee of State's Attorney Office, in [City], Conn. (Feb. 23, 2016) (noting
that panic around trial stems first and foremost from the fact that victims are "afraid to not be believed");
Telephone interviews with victim-oriented nonprofits, supra notes 47, 48.
128. Michelle J. Anderson, Diminishing the Legal Impact of Negative Social Attitudes Toward
Acquaintance Rape Victims, 13 NEW CRIM. L. REv. 644, 660 (2010) ("Rape law has been wrong to help
create, perpetuate, and enforce moral judgments on women's sexual lives."); Michelle J. Anderson,
Women Do Not Report the Violence They Suffer: Violence Against Women and the State Action Doctrine,
46 VILL. L. REv. 907, 938 (2001) (describing how rape victims "experience anxiety, embarrassment and
self-blame as a result of sexual victimization"); Catharine A. MacKinnon, In Their Hands: Restoring
Institutional Liability for Sexual Harassment in Education, 125 YALE L.J. 2038, 2091 n.259 (2016)
(explaining how promises that reporting rape is confidential are often "illusory").
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to report is often already a fine balance. It may take only unspoken indications
of disbelief to change a victim's mind. The statistically low probability of arrest
and conviction for rape already discourages victims because often the "main
thing" they want is a conviction.129 As a detective explained, victims "research
everything. If they research rape and see that the rapist has less than a three
percent chance of jail time, they think: 'Report for what? To ruin my
reputation?"'1 3 0 Seeing the low chances of conviction, created in part by these
templates, victims decide reporting is not worth the cost.
With all these background reasons not to report rape, victims' bar for
dissuasion based on police behavior is low: "[o]ne thing is all it takes to get [a
victim] to back out."1 31 Victims react especially strongly to detectives'
expressions of disbelief "The number one reason why people disengage with the
police department is because of the first experience that they have with a police
officer." 32 The "experience" that prompts victims to drop out is one that
convinces them that the detectives will "not believe[] a victim because [they] are
predisposed to not believe the victim."133
Victims do not need to speak to a police officer for police skepticism to
discourage them from reporting. The majority of victims disclose their rape to
someone else before reporting to the police,1 34 and the victims "place [great]
weight on the reactions of these individuals."l35 Thus, in the words of detectives,
whether victims report or not often "depends on what [families, friends, and
classmates] tell them. . . . If someone tells their friend, 'this happened to me,'
and the friend says, 'Me too, it's better to let it go,' they will not report." 36
Someone who has had a bad experience with the police department will confirm
the victims' fears about the police treatment she will receive and will advise her
129. Interview with [City] Police Dep't Detective, supra note 43 ("All [the victim] wanted was an
arrest.").
130. See Interview with [University] Police Dep't Supervisors, supra note 63. The statistic that the
detective referred to comes from the Rape, Abuse & Incest National Network (RAINN), which reports
that only 3% of rapists spend a day in jail. 97 of Every 100 Rapists Receive No Punishment, RAINN
Analysis Shows, RAPE, ABUSE & INCEST NAT'L NETWORK, (Mar. 27, 2012),
https://www.rainn.org/statistics/criminal-justice-system.
131. Interview with victim-oriented nonprofit, supra note 49.
132. Id; see also Interview with [City] Police Dep't Special Victims Unit Supervisors, supra note
40 ("[Patrol officers] are the first person who a victim sees and can shape the investigation and make it
easier or harder for [detectives]."); Telephone interview ith victim-oriented nonprofit, supra note 47 (If
the responding patrol officers are rude, "it doesn't matter how good the SVU is because they're never
going to see the victim.").
133. Telephone interview with victim-oriented nonprofit, supra note 47.
134. Interview with [City] Police Dep't Special Victims Unit Detectives, supra note 43; see Victoria
Sit & Regina A. Schuller, Understanding Support Providers' Views of "Helpful" Responses to Sexual
Assault Disclosures, J. INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE 1, 2 (2015) ("Victims frequently turn to friends,
relatives, and romantic partners, and are considerably less inclined to report their experiences to formal
helpers."). See generally Paul et al., supra note 7.
135. Sit & Schuller, supra note 134, at 3.
136. Interview with [City] Police Dep't Special Victims Unit Detectives, supra note 43.
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not to report.137 For example, because of the bad experiences victims have had
with the CPD, the victim services organizations do not encourage victims to
report to the CPD unless they affirmatively express a desire to do so.138 In this
way, the templates can underlie even the decisions of rape victims who choose
never to report to the police.
In sum, many rape victims modify their reporting decisions in response to
indications of detectives' disbelief of their accusation, which can be expressed
through detectives' use of rape process templates. Though explicitly only about
the allegation's strength and the victim's ability to withstand the normal tests
required by the criminal justice process, the rape process templates-especially
to those primed to hear skepticism-sound like heightened skepticism about the
allegation itself. Statements about the supposedly unique features of a rape
prosecution are heard as statements about the credibility of the allegation itself.
To the extent that victims do not report due to fear of disbelief, the rape process
templates contribute to victims' hesitancy to report or pursue their allegations of
rape.
Recognizing the templates and parsing their effects partially explain a broad
phenomenon: victims tend not to report their rape even in jurisdictions where the
police departments do not harass and humiliate victims intentionally. In the CPD,
for example, even these facially-neutral templates are imposed unintentionally.
But regardless of the intentions, they reinforce the behaviors in detectives that
discourage victims from reporting or pursuing allegations of rape and signal
disbelief to victims. Although they seem more innocuous than the "real rape"
myth, the rape process templates undermine the effective prosecution of rape.
The next section discusses how, in doing so, the templates preserve the historic
skepticism that rape victims face when seeking criminal consequences for their
rapist.
IV. THE CONSEQUENCES OF RAPE PROCESS TEMPLATES
The skepticism about rape allegations at the heart of the rape process
templates fits into a long tradition of police skepticism of rape allegations, even
though that skepticism is now presented in the newer narrative of rape process
templates rather than the traditional narrative regarding the definition of rape.
The legal definition of rape shapes the criminal justice process around rape and
for this reason is the focus of many legal scholars.139 But scholars have noted the
137. See DOJ Gender Bias Guidance, supra note 19, at 8 ("[Ilf law enforcement agencies do not
respond effectively to an incident of sexual assault . .. , victims are less likely to participate in the
investigation and prosecution of their case or seek police assistance in the future.").
138. Telephone interview with victim-oriented nonprofits, supra note 48.
139. See, e.g., STEPHEN J. SCHULHOFER, UNWANTED SEX 254 (1998) (dedicating an entire book to
the definition of rape); Michelle J. Anderson, Negotiating Sex, 78 S. CAL. L. REv. 1401, 1407 (2005)
(devoting an entire Article to the definition of rape); Deborah Tuerkheimer, Sex Without Consent, 123
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limitations of a singular focus on legal definitions when evaluating the legal
treatment of rape. As Estrich wrote, "the answer is not to write the perfect statute.
While some statutes invite a more restrictive application than others, there is no
'model statute' solution to rape law, because the problem has never been the
words of the statutes as much as our interpretation of them."'40
Estrich saw how the "real rape" myth, rather than the statutory definition of
rape, determined what rapes led to criminal punishment. Though the statutory
definition of rape rarely requires that the victim resist physically or that the rapist
be unknown to the victim, "[w]here less force is used or no other physical injury
is inflicted, where threats are inarticulate, where the two know each other, where
the setting is not an alley but a bedroom . . the law, as reflected in the opinions
of the courts, the interpretation, if not the words, of the statutes, and the decisions
of those within the criminal justice system . .. tell us that no crime has taken
place."1 41 That is, the "real rape" myth grafted additional requirements onto the
legal definition without any decision by legislators to do so. The additional
requirements embedded in the real rape myth make it even more likely that the
criminal justice process will discourage victims and will not serve their goals.
The rape narratives that shape the criminal justice system and the manner in
which they shape the process today have changed since Estrich wrote. The real
rape myth remains, 14 but subtler skepticism expressed through devices like the
rape process templates has emerged.143 The templates are like the earlier rape
myths in their origin and their result. They originate from an implicit skepticism
by detectives or prosecutors about the credibility of rape victims and their
allegations. They result in the imposition onto investigations of rape additional
requirements not imposed on other crimes and not mandated by the statutory
language. And they make it less likely that detectives conduct investigations that
lead to arrests. In producing and justifying these results, both the real rape myth
and the rape process templates deter victims from reporting their rape to the
police by conveying to them disbelief about their allegations.
YALE L.J. F. 335 (2013) (same). The debate over the Model Penal Code's definition of rape is illustrative.
The relevant article, Article 213, is "outdated" in the words of the ALI, Model Penal Code: SexualAssault
and Related Offenses, AM. L. INST. (2016), https://www.ali.org/projects/show/sexual-assault-and-related-
offenses/, but the effort to update the Article is so controversial that the project to update it has dragged
out over three years and three "tentative" or "discussion" drafts, see Model Penal Code: Sexual Assault
and Related Offenses: Shop Individual Parts, AM. L. INST. (2016),
https://www.ali.org/publications/show/sexual-assault-and-related-offenses/#drafts.
140. Estrich, supra note 123, at 1093; see also Kimberl6 Crenshaw, Mapping the Margins, 43
STAN. L. REV. 1241, 1271 (1991) ("[Tihe degree to which legal reform can directly challenge cultural
beliefs that shape rape trials is limited.").
141. Estrich, supra note 123, at 1092.
142. Bennett Capers, Real Rape Too, 99 CALIF. L. REV. 1259, 1305 (2011) ("[T]he fact remains
that law enforcement officers, prosecutors, jurors, and judges are still measuring each rape allegation
against a preexisting 'real rape' script."); Lonsway & Archambault, supra note 12, at 152 ("[P]olice
officers . . . are frequently skeptical of reports that do not resemble the . . . stereotypic image [of violent,
stranger rape)." (citation omitted)).
143. See supra Part Ill.
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The rape process templates also meaningfully differ from the real rape myth:
they create these extra-statutory impediments by a more indirect and facially
neutral route. Rape process templates do not address the victims' experience with
the rape itself, as the real rape myth does. Instead, they question the process.
They ask whether the rape left enough evidence and happened to an articulate
enough victim to make the rape worth investigating, prosecuting, and ultimately
punishing. Though framed in terms of whether it is possible to prosecute certain
rapes successfully, implicit in the templates' doubt is a question of whether it is
right and fair to prosecute these rapes given the supposed lack of physical
evidence or presumed uncertainty of the victim's testimony at trial.
By creating this indirect and seemingly neutral route for disbelief, rape
process templates allow the "preservation through transformation" of the
traditional real rape myth.144 As Reva Siegel articulates, preservation through
transformation occurs when, because reformers successfully challenge the
legitimacy of an existing power regime, legislators and judges "both cede and
defend status privileges-gradually relinquishing the original rules and
justificatory rhetoric of the contested regime and finding new rules and reasons
to protect such status privileges as they choose to defend."145 Rather than
overthrowing the existing power regime as they hoped to do, the reformers only
"pressur[e] legal elites to translate [the regime] into a more contemporary, and
less controversial, social idiom. "146
Just as Siegel predicts, the rape process templates are the "less controversial,
social idiom" used today to express the doubt about rape allegations that the real
rape myth stated more directly.147 Reformers have challenged, but not
overthrown, the power regimes inside and outside the criminal justice process
that disempower, disbelieve, and silence rape victims. The skepticism of rape
victims remains protected; only the direct expression of it has been relinquished.
This understanding of the templates reveals why they are so consequential:
they shape the law of rape. More specifically, they reveal how detectives shape
the law of rape: by choosing which allegations to investigate, to investigate
carefully, and to bring to prosecutors, they filter which rape allegations have a
chance of making it to court and thus into case law. To the extent that hey impose
the rape process templates onto cases when they make these investigatory
decisions, detectives unintentionally ensure that the more contested, less
provable cases never end up in front of a judge or a jury. The imposition of these
templates at the investigatory stage creates a cycle in which the more messy and




147. Michelle J. Anderson, Campus Sexual Assault Adjudication and Resistance to Reform, 125
YALE L.J. 1940, 1959 (2016) ("Whenever there is progressive movement in the law, one might predict a
backlash designed to secure the privilege that the law is in the process of disrupting. Unsurprisingly, there
has been a backlash against the progressive reform movement in rape law.").
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contested cases do not advance through the criminal justice system, so
prosecutors, judges, and juries are not pushed to reconsider their assumptions
about rape or about what a provable rape allegation is. When detectives close
rape cases without physical evidence or without an articulate and willing victim
(even when required to by prosecutors), they avoid pressuring judges and juries
to question or at least acknowledge the existence of their assumptions. By
contrast, researching all cases thoroughly and pursuing more contested cases on
a regular basis would force all of them to broaden their understanding of the
reality of rape. The templates and the premature closures of investigations which
the templates partially cause eliminate the opportunity for judges or juries to
affirm the victim, credit her allegation, and convict the rapist without physical
evidence or without an articulate and willing victim.
The detectives know that "if you don't do [rape cases] often enough, you'll
never win. You won't have the tools and techniques necessary to get the
corroborating evidence."'48 The same applies to prosecutors (who do not learn
how to prosecute effectively the full range of rape cases) and to judges (who tend
to respond conservatively to cases they find unfamiliar). By imposing rape
process templates onto allegations at the first stage of the criminal justice
process, detectives unintentionally keep prosecutors and judges from getting the
experience with rape cases they themselves value so highly. They keep from
prosecutors and judges the reality of rape allegations: that they can be messy,
incomplete, and contested, and yet real nonetheless. Only once detectives,
prosecutors, judges, and juries face the messiness of all rapes will they be able
to investigate, prosecute, and judge rape allegations in a way that vindicates
victims who report their rape to the police.
V. OUTSIDE OVERSIGHT OVER LOCAL POLICE DEPARTMENTS
A. State-Based Oversight
To police and prosecute rape more effectively, detectives must stop
imposing rape process templates to predict and thus ensure that rape allegations
have certain characteristics ("he said, she said" cases lacking physical evidence
and resulting in a "brutal cross-examination"). This would be difficult for police
departments to do unilaterally. It appears hard for police officers to recognize
their deployment of the templates on their own. And, given police departments'
place in the larger system-that is, so long as detectives respond to prosecutors,
and so long as prosecutors fear losing rape cases in front of a judge or a jury-
internal efforts by police departments alone will be ineffective.
148. Interview with [City] Police Dep't Special Victims Unit Detectives, supra note 43.
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The UPD's success under federal and university oversight at improving its
response to victims suggests that a system of outside oversight is one way to
reduce the deployment and effect of the templates. Although the CPD and the
UPD made similar efforts to respond better to rape victims (for example,
sufficiently staffing the SVU, training detectives, and partnering with victim-
oriented groups) and have similarly good intentions, the UPD appears to have
reduced its detectives' use of the templates far more effectively than the CPD
has. 149
What is the source of this difference? Though it is impossible to know for
sure, many of the structural, staffmg, and experiential changes to the UPD that
seem effective in reducing the use of the templates today arose out of the OCR's
Title IX investigation of the university.so This investigation created two
channels of oversight-one by the Office of the General Counsel over the
UPD1 5' and one by the OCR over the university as an institutionl52-and
required that the UPD conduct honest evaluations with victim advocates, assess
if it discourages victims from reporting or pursuing allegations of rape through
anonymous surveys, and address whatever its assessments reveal to be the
sources of discouragement. That is, outside oversight prompted the UPD and the
university to look to the results that their improvements achieved rather than just
to the efforts devoted to the improvements.
Though the CPD-vs.-UPD comparison suggests that a form of federal
oversight, Title IX, drove effective change for the university police department,
state oversight is the more practical and likely form of outside oversight for
municipal police departments. This is in part because today's systems of direct
federal oversight over local police departments appear unsuited to this task, given
their emphasis on individualized support, intensive fact finding, and tailored
supervision. The federal oversight established under the Obama Administration
was valuable but limited: the DOJ signed consent decrees based on sex-based
discrimination in policing with only four police departments."' The DOJ lacks
the resources to impose consent decrees or any form of tailored federal oversight
on all 18,000 law enforcement agencies in the United States.154 Moreover,
federal oversight over local police departments that are not found to be in
violation of federal laws, as those four departments have been, raises potential
149. See supra Part III.
150. See supra notes 57-76 and accompanying text.
151. Interviews with [University] Police Dep't Supervisors, supra notes 44, 63.
152. Letter from Thomas J. Hibino, supra note 65; Voluntary Resolution Agreement, supra note 65.
153. See Special Litigation Section Cases and Matters, U.S. DEP'T JUSTICE,
https://www.justice.gov/crt/special-litigation-section-cases-and-matters0#police (listing four consent
decrees focused on gender-biased policing); see also supra note 22 for the Montana consent decrees.
154. Brian A. Reaves, Census of State and Local Law Enforcement Agencies, 2008, U.S. DEP'T
JUST. (July 2011), at 2, https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/cslleaO8.pdf (noting there are "17,985 state
and local law enforcement agencies employing at least one full-time officer or the equivalent in part-time
officers" nationwide).
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issues of federalism.'55 Conversely, state-based oversight allows states to tailor
national policies to their needs, based on their financial resources, geographic
and demographic trends, and existing strengths and weaknesses of the local
police departments.
State oversight of rape policing can build on state oversight systems that
already exist. For example, the state of Connecticut already has the Police Officer
Standards and Training Council (POSTC), a part of the Department of
Emergency Services & Public Protection. POSTC determines the training
requirements and runs the training sessions necessary both to become a police
officer and to retain certification as a police officer within the state of
Connecticut.15 6 Given that the legal and logistical structure for this training
already exists, adding specialized training on the rape process templates and how
to avoid their deployment should be straightforward.
POSTC also administers the state-mandated accreditation program of police
departments.' As part of this accreditation process, POSTC sets the standards,
determines departments' initial compliance with the standards, and conducts
periodic audits of the departments' statistics and surveys.' Unlike the police
officer training, departments can choose not to seek accreditation by POSTC.
But because the accreditation program reduces departments' civil liability, the
choice to forgo accreditation is expensive.15 In addition, POSTC creates "model
policies, procedures, and guidelines" for certain popular topics.160 There can be
political pressure on local police departments to adopt those policies, particularly
when the publication of the models prompts the creation of state initiatives and
partnerships to disseminate and implement the policies.161
The state oversight board already has a procedure for the hardest part of the
implementation and evaluation of standards: collecting and evaluating statistics.
At the outset of its accreditation process, POSTC requires that police
departments sign an agreement promising to share all necessary documentation
with POSTC.162 While some of the recommendations regarding rape process
155. See Lauren M. Ouziel, Legitimacy and Federal Criminal Enforcement Power, 123 YALE L.J.
2236, 2246 (2014).
156. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 7-294d (West, Westlaw through Jan. 1, 2017). For original training,
see CONN. AGENCIES REGS. § 7-294e-3 (amended 2015). For re-training, see CONN. AGENCIES REGS. H
7-294e-2, 7-294e-14(c) (updated 2015).
157. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 7-294d(22).
158. Id.
159. CONNECTICUT POLICE OFFICER STANDARDS AND TRAINING COUNCIL, ACCREDITATION
STANDARDS MANUAL (5th ed. June 1, 2016),
http://www.ct.gov/post/cwp/view.asp?a=2058&q=393770&postNav-|.
160. See, e.g., Connecticut Statewide Model Policy: Police Response to Crimes ofFamily Violence,
ST. CT. (Sept. 2016),
http://www.ct.gov/post/lib/post/publications/police-response-to-cimes-of family-violence_2016.pdf.
161. See, e.g., Law Enforcement Initiative, CT. COALITION AGAINST DOMESTIC VIOLENCE,
http://www.ctcadv.org/projects-initiatives/law-enforcement-initiative/; see also Law Enforcement
Program: The Benefits, CALEA, http://www.calea.org/content/law-enforcement-program-benefits.
162. Law Enforcement Accreditation Program Application, CT. DEP'T EMERGENCY SERVS. & PUB.
PROTECTION (2017), http://www.ct.gov/post/cwp/view.asp?a=2058&q=394972.
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templates would require police departments to track new or more in-depth
metrics, the basic structure for tracking metrics within the police departments
and sharing them with the state is already established.
Other states have similar systems to POSTC that provide training, standards,
and oversight to local police departments in their state.'63 Standards for how
police deal with rape victims could be deployed quickly and collegially through
state oversight systems because, as POSTC illustrates, these oversight systems
already engage in exactly this type of standards- and process-setting exercise.
Using these existing systems to address rape process templates is likely to
engender less resistance than federal oversight would. Although local tailoring
creates the possibility for serious dilution of the standards, the recommendations
set forth below (such as the emphasis on honest feedback from local victim
advocates and metrics) can reduce the possibility of significant dilution.
One downside of state oversight as it exists today is that these systems do
not subject police departments to liability or revocation of funding if they fail to
improve their response to rape. Financial consequences tend to ensure that good
results, not just good efforts, exist. This extra impetus is important given the
subtlety of the rape process templates and their reinforcement throughout the
criminal justice system. To remedy this gap, states can attach local funding
conditions or incentive payments for compliance with the state standards,
heightening the stakes of noncompliance. For departments like the CPD that
genuinely believe that they do not deter victims, this liability may be
unnecessary; simply providing structures that adequately inform them, both
quantitatively and qualitatively, of the reactions that victims have to their
department may be sufficient. But for other departments, a more consequential
form of oversight may be necessary.
As Connecticut's structure illustrates, it is both feasible and likely effective
to attach systems of oversight for the policing of rape allegations onto existing
systems of state oversight. These state systems already conduct training, set
standards, and evaluate departments. State oversight allows quick deployment of
new standards, local tailoring, and reliance on existing structures for ongoing
audits. These state systems of oversight offer great potential to teach police about
rape process templates and evaluate whether police can successfully avoid their
deployment.
163. See, e.g., Criminal Justice Policy Boards and Commissions, N.Y. DEP'T CRIM. JUST. SERVS.,
http://criminaljustice.ny.gov/pio/boards/index.html (describing the New York State police accreditation
council, the Law Enforcement Agency Accreditation Council, which operates like POSTC, but in the state
of New York); Our Mission Statement, CAL. POLICE ACCREDITATION COALITION,
http://www.californiapac.org/index.html (describing the California Police Accreditation Coalition, a
nonprofit organization that operates like POSTC for the state of Califomia).
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B. Key Components of State-Based Oversight
An effective system of state oversight should focus on ensuring that police
departments engage productively with victims and their concerns. More
concretely, an effective state-oversight system should mandate that police
departments do three things: first, train police officers on rape process templates
and the common reactions of rape victims to their imposition; second, conduct
regular meetings with local victim advocates; and third, evaluate metrics
regarding their handling of rape complaints from the complaint to its final
disposition. It must place the responsibility on police departments to learn
whether, to what extent, and how they deter victims by employing these
templates (or any other discouraging devices) and to devise programs and
procedural changes that counter or eliminate their use. Such a system would
educate police officers about the effects of their actions, force them to change
the actions that discourage victims, and give them the tools necessary to push
back on skeptical detectives, supervisors, and prosecutors.
The first component of oversight is training for police officers on the rape
process templates and victims' common reactions to them. But almost every
recommendation on how to improve a police department-or any organization,
for that matter-starts with a recommendation of additional training. How is this
different? This training, as opposed to much police training, would not focus on
what police do (wrong), but instead on the typical, unique, and potentially
counterintuitive concerns of rape victims. To the extent that this training focuses
on police officers, it explains how their potentially good intentions can be
misread or misdirected. The emphasis on how the good intentions of police
officers can be misunderstood is crucial to this training because, as this Note
illustrates, many officers who deter victims have good intentions, particularly
when they work in a specialized SVU. Discouraging them or questioning their
intentions is counterproductive. Thus, this training must focus on a side that
police training tends to overlook: the victims' perspective, both independent of
and in conjunction with police behaviors.
This training should be informed by the growing body of both scholarship
and practical experience on police training that emphasizes the importance of
equal treatment of all types of victims and suspects.'6 This training focuses on
164. See, e.g., Tom R. Tyler, Procedural Justice, Legitimacy, and the Effective Rule of Law, 30
CRIME & JUST. 283 (2003) (arguing that the success of policing depends in large part on residents'
cooperation with the police and that residents cooperate with the police when they believe the police act
fairly toward those in their community); Tom Tyler, Police Discretion in the 21st Century Surveillance
State, 2016 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 579, 580 (2016).
2017] 237
Yale Journal of Law and Feminism
topics such as implicit bias'65 and stereotyping.16 This more common training
can provide guidance on training about rape process templates because it focuses
on unintended and unconscious police behavior and victims' and suspects'
reactions to that behavior, and on effective ways to inform people that they
engage in this unconscious behavior without accusing them of conscious bias.
Second, oversight systems should require regular meetings with local victim
services organizations. Some of the most surprising and counterintuitive insights
of this Note arose from the interviews with local victim services organizations
about victims' perceptions of the CPD SVU. Even more than the author's direct
observations of the CPD, these interviews elucidated what victims expect, how
victims confirm or dispel their fears based on how police officers act, and how
victims filter their view of police officers through their (socially imposed)
expectations and fears. Victim advocates also provided a more accurate view of
how the CPD operates as opposed to how it aspires to operate.
Without formal mechanisms for feedback, victim advocates do not feel
comfortable providing feedback to police departments. Individual victims who
chose to drop their allegations out of frustration with the police department are
unlikely to deem any further contact with the police department productive.
Victim advocates express fear that providing honest feedback would undermine
their relationship with the police department, a relationship which is crucial to
their success on behalf of the victims they support.'6 7 Police departments can
counter this hesitancy by setting up formal feedback structures and even
anonymous online forms.
The meetings with local victim services organizations should be regularly
scheduled and include as wide a range of advocates as possible. Victim advocates
from local rape crisis centers, rape hotlines, women's shelters, local universities,
and any other group with frequent contact with rape victims should be invited.
While standards cannot set any concrete requirements for who should be invited,
both the local police and the state oversight board together should choose the
groups to be included, to avoid exclusion of unpopular or critical victim
advocates. To be most productive, these meetings should focus not on resolution
of individual complaints, but instead on the broader trends around the
relationship between police department and victims in the area.
Third, there must be frequent and uniform tracking and review of metrics on
rape complaints. Metrics are where the rubber meets the road. Yet today, updated
and uniform metrics on how rape allegations progress through police
departments do not exist. Because of this gap, this final recommendation-that
165. See generally Justin D. Levinson & Robert J. Smith, Systemic Implicit Bias, 126 YALE L.J. F.
406, 407 (2017); Robert J. Smith, Reducing Racially Disparate Policing Outcomes: Is Implicit Bias
Training the Answer?, 37 U. HAW. L. REv. 295, 296 (2015).
166. See generally Cynthia J. Najdowski et al., Stereotype Threat and Racial Differences in
Citizens'Experiences ofPolice Encounters, 39 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 463, 468 (2015).
167. Telephone interview with victim-oriented nonprofits, supra note 47.
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the metrics on the progress of rape allegations must be tracked at a granular level
and evaluated regularly-underlies the success of the other recommendations.
Like meetings with victim advocates, metrics can shift police departments from
evaluating their success based on the extent of their improvement efforts to
evaluating the actual impact of their improvements on victims. Metrics can
reveal the success or failure of the improvements.
While they must be determined ultimately by the state board, specific
metrics should include how many rape allegations are reported to the police,
categorized by the reporting means used; how many rape kits are collected,
compared to allegations reported; how many include a victim interview; how
many proceed to physical evidence collection; how many include an interview
with the alleged rapist; how many are submitted to a prosecutor for an arrest
warrant; how many result in a signed arrest warrant; how many result in an arrest;
how many result in a trial; and how many result in a conviction (of any kind, by
kind). At a minimum, these metrics allow police departments to evaluate if there
are any parts of the reporting and investigation process that are particularly
problematic for victims and their allegations. At best, the metrics encourage
police departments to assess each stage of the investigatory process for
opportunities to encourage victims.
Together, these elements of an oversight system can help police departments
evaluate and reduce their deployment of rape process templates. Training is
crucial because rape process templates are subtle and strongly supported by
cultural perceptions of rape. Meetings with local victim advocates ensure that
police departments accurately perceive how often they deploy the templates and
how that affects victims' experiences. Tracking metrics underlies both the.
training and the meetings because it provides another way to measure if the
improvements help solve the original problem: the low rates at which victims
report and pursue their allegations of rape. The implementation of these
recommendations is a first step towards recognizing and reducing the power of
rape process templates in police departments and potentially increasing the
reporting rates for rape.
CONCLUSION
This Note helps explain a possible reason why, despite efforts to improve
policing, fewer than a third of rape victims report their rape to the police and an
even smaller number pursue those allegations to an arrest. Based on a case study
of two local and well-intentioned police departments, this Note suggests that one
cause of the low rates of reporting rape is police officers' unintentional use of
rape process templates, namely the "he said, she said" and "brutal cross-
examination" templates. These templates manifest themselves in comments and
attitudes that subtly signal skepticism to rape victims about their allegations.
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Rape victims respond strongly to these hints because they fear and are primed to
expect skepticism. An unexpected insight of the Note's research was that even
police officers who care deeply about victims often still impose these
discouraging templates, thus preserving the historically entrenched disbelief of
rape allegations despite their best intentions.
The Note proposes a solution to the deployment of these templates, also
grounded in the case study of the two police departments. With outside oversight,
the UPD has countered the rape process templates more effectively than the CPD
has. This suggests that state oversight may provide a solution, particularly when
it comes with financial stakes and if it includes training on rape process
templates, regular meetings with local victim services organizations, and
tracking and evaluating metrics on the progression of rape allegations.
Rape process templates do not just stop individual rape victims from
reporting their rape. They also slow the development of the law regarding what
rape allegations are considered credible, provable, and ultimately, real. It matters
little that the legal definition of rape expands if police officers use an outdated,
narrow, and unconscious definition to determine what rape allegations are
credible enough to be investigated fully or which rape victims deserve a chance
in court. For the response to rape to evolve sufficiently to mirror expanding legal
definitions and social understandings of rape, state oversight boards must ensure
that local police departments do not deploy rape process templates. They must
provide police officers with the training, local contacts, and statistics necessary
to enable them to enact their good intentions.
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